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NOTE AND COMMENT
DEEDS To TAKE EFECT UPON DEATH ov GRANToR.-That instruments in
form of wills may be effective as deeds of conveyance is clear. If a present'
interest is passed and execution is complete (which includes delivery), the
instrument must take effect as a deed. On the other' hand, if no interest is
to vest until or after death of the maker and there has been no complete
execution as a deed, the instrument, if operative at all, must take effect as a
will. Difficulties arise when there is a fully executed deed, which, however,
is to be postponed in its complete operation until the death of the grantor.
Where the grantor delivers the deed to a third party to be handed by him
to the grantee on the grantor's death there is substantial agreement among
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the courts that such instrument is not ineffective as an attempted testamentary
disposition. The cases of Felt v. Felt, I55 Mich. 237; and O'Brien v. O'Brien,
ig N. D. 713, cited by Professor Tiffany in I4 CoL. L. REv. 404, as holding
the other way are explained on the ground that there had been no delivery
of the deeds. The chief differences of opinion- in this class of cases has beLn
as to the time when and the extent to which such deeds divest the grantor
of ownership. See i6 MvICH. LAw REv. 586, where the matter is discussed.
The real difficulty arises when the grantor inserts into the deed a provision
in substance that "this deed shall t,-ke effect upon the death of the grantor."
In a number of cases it has been held that such provision makes the deed an
attempted testamentary disposition and as such void for lack of proper
execution. Turner v. Scott, 5I Pa. 126; Sperber v. Balster, 66 Ga. 317 (Cf.
White v. Hopkins, 8o Ga. I54) ; Pinkham v. Pinkhan, 55 Neb. 729; Bigley v.
Souvey, .45 Mich. 370; Shaull v. Slzaull, (Iowa) 16o N. W. 36. The leading
American case appears to be Turne;- v. Scott, supra, which -seems to depend
not a little upon the slender foundation of Habergham v. Vincent, 2 Ves.
Jr. 204.
In quite a number of jurisdictions deeds with provisions postponing com-
plete operation until the grantor's death have been upheld as deeds of convey-
ance. Abney v. Moore, lo6 Ala. i31; Bunch v. Nicks, 5o Ark. 367; Latimer
V. Latimer, 174 Ill. 418; Kelly v. Shimer, 152 Ind. 290; Abbott v. Holway. 72
Me. 298; Lauck v. Logan, 45 W. Va. 251. There is no common ground on
which these cases proceed. Perhaps the general view is that the deed operates
as a conveyance in praesenti, with a life estate reserved somehow to -the
grantor. The bold attitude of the Maine court as displayed in Abbott v.
Holway, supra, is refreshing. The provision in the deed there in question
was: "This deed is not to take effect and operate as a conveyance until my
decease." In an action of waste against the grantor's representative for
cutting trees after the delivery of the deed the court held that the deed might
operate "as the parties intended, and carry an estate to commence in futuro
without the necessity of resorting to any subterfuges under which the estate
thus created to commence in futuro, may be regarded as existing only by way
of remainder or by virtue of some undisputed covenant to stand seized."
Why should not a deed be operative to convey an estate in fee simple or
any other estate upon the death of the grantor, just as well as to create such
an estate the first of next July? Of course no strings can be kept on such
deed, it must be beyond the legal (as distinguished from the physical) power
and control of the maker, in other words, it must have been delivered. Any
such reservation would either negative delivery, and there would be no
deed at all, or the instrument would be ambulatory, a quality attached to
testamentary dispositions. To be sure, under the common law conveyances
it Nas definitely established that estates of freehold could not be created to
commence in futuro. "It has long been settled that, according to the com-
mon law, a limitation of an estate of freehold to commence in futuro is void."
Savill v. Bethell, [1902] 2 Ch. 523, 540, citing Buckler's Case, 2 Co. Rep. 55a;
Barwick's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 93b; Roe v. Tranmer, Willes 682, 2 Wils. 75.
It was, however, possible to create uses, no -matter how large the estate there-
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in, in futuro, and when the Statute of Uses made the modes of creating ues
effective as conveyances there was available a ready means of accomplishing
what under common law modes of conveyancing had been impossible. Sazill
v. Bethell, supra; Murray v. Kerney, 115 Md. 514. The transaction giving
rise to the future use of course had to be complete. If, for instance, the use
was to arise out of a covenant to stand seized it is obvious that the covenant
must have been sealed and delivered, in other words, it must have appeared
that there was a completed legal act. And all such necessary steps must
have been taken in the lifetime of the covenantor; if it should appear that it
was his intention that no legal act should be consummated until after his
death, obviously the whole transaction would fail.
Almost all deeds of conveyance take effect or can take effect under the
Statute of Uses, and-ordinarily courts show the greatest liberality in uphold-
ing deeds in order to accomplish what the parties intended, whatever may
be the form. Thus in Roe v. Traniner, supra, a deed in form a common law
release was upheld as a covenant to stand seized; in Havens v. Sea Shore
Land Co., 47 N. J. Eq. 365, a deed with the words "remise, release, and quit
claim" was given effect as a bargain and sale; in Murray v. Kerney, supra,
an instrument that looked like an attempted will was upheld as a covenant
to stand seised. Independently of the Statute of Uses a deed may effect the
creation of a freehold in futuro, the statute of the state wherein lies the land
being construed as making such result possible. The Maine statute provides
that "a person owning real estate and having a right of entry into it, whether
seised of it or not, may convey it, or all his interest in it, by a deed," etc. It
was under this statute that Abbott v. Howay, supra, was decided. See also
Wilson v. Carrico, i4o Ind. 533; Ferguson v. Mason, 6o Wis. 377; Millcr v.
Miller, 91 Kans. I.
Any dispositive instrument to be fully operative only on the maker's death
certainly bears one of the ear-marks of a will. In view of the foregoing,
however, it seems clear that such fact cannot in itself be controlling. Where
the circumstances disclose a completed legal act so far as the maker is con-
cerned, with no express or implied power of revocation, such instrument
would seem prima facie to be no testamentary disposition and the fact that
complete operation is postponed until death should not be a sufficient circum-
stance to give the instrument an ambulatory character, a necessary quality of
wills, ex hypothesi the instrument is complete and final as far as the maker
is concerned and therefore cannot be ambulatory. When a court says, as
did the Illinois court in O'Brien v. O'Bricn, 121 N. E. 243, that "To constitute
delivery it must clearly appear that it was the grantor's intention that the deed
should pass title at the time and that he should loge control over the same,"
an element that has no place in delivery is made an essential part thereof.
"A will is an instrument by which a person makes a disposition of his
property to take effect after his decease and which is in its own nature
ambulatory and revocable during his life." JARMAN ON WILLS, (6th ed.) 27.
Relatively slight circumstances added to the postponement of full operation
until death may be sufficient to show a testamentary interest, in which case
the instrument would of course be revocable despite apparent delivery. See
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Thorold v. Thorold, I Phil. I; Fielding v. Walshaw, 27 W. R. 492; Ison V.
Halcomb, 136 Ky. 523. In Fletcher v. Fletcher, 4 Hare Ch. 67, Vice-Chancellor.
Wigram said: "The third question is whether the plaintiff is precluded from
relief in this court, on the ground suggested, that this is a testamentary
paper * * * I have read the cases cited as to the instrument being testa-
mentary * * * I certainly was not prepared to find that the cases had
gone so far as they have upon ihe subject. Those cases, however, are very
distinguishable from the one before me. This is not a case where there is
a general power of revocati6n reserved-a general power to dispose by will
notwithstanding the execution of the instrument. In the cases referred to
there has been a general revocation-or something like a revocation-of the
party's right to deal with the property, notwithstanding the instrument; and
the courts- have held, that in -such cases the instrument being one which
was not to have effect until the death of the party-or rather, I would .say,
to use the language of Sir John Nicholl in one of the cases in which, until
the death of the party, the instrument itself was not consummated-until
then no conclusive effect could be given to it. If that does not occur, the
instrument is not to be considered as testamentary." R. W. A.
